Abstract
that is approximately 80%, of national EEA DPAs participated, together with a further six operating at the regional level. 10 The survey results demonstrated that European DPAs overwhelmingly hold data protection norms to be strongly engaged across the online media space. Such an onerous interpretative stance reflects the symbolic centrality of data protection within the now maturing area of EU fundamental rights coupled with the role DPAs play as "the guardians" 11 of this framework, both nationally 12 and in the pan-European Article 29 Working Party. 13 In contrast, as will be explored below, enforcement has been both weak and lacking in harmonization. Whilst the generally low level of enforcement may be linked to the meagre financial resources of the DPAs, divergences between them relate rather to continuing disparities in their interpretative stance. Only DPAs with an unusually strong ideological commitment to data protection proved likely to have engaged in extensive enforcement activity, a fact which may be related to the risks this entails in terms of potentially taking on powerful interests such as Google or Facebook and garnering negative publicity. A focus in some of the literature on often largely paper-based processes of "networked governance" 14 within the Working Party may, therefore, overemphasise the level of practical effectiveness and harmonization that this regime has achieved.
Whilst the General Data Protection Regulation recognises some of these challenges, it is unclear how effective the reforms it stipulates will prove in practice.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The first section briefly introduces the essential legal context including the default structure and substance of Directive 95/46, the original debate on its interface with public freedom of expression and the evolution of thinking on this issue consequent to the seminal case of Lindqvist. 15 The next then reviews the existing literature and outlines the specific research questions posed, and the methodology adopted, in this study. The following two sections present and then analyse the general pattern of results. The article then turns 10 The survey entitled ʻDPA Survey on Data Protection and the Open Societyʼ was carried out by myself and made possible as a result of funding from the British Academy. to explore the significant differences between the different jurisdictions as regards DPA enforcement, focusing on whether these might be explained by divergences in the level of financial resourcing of these agencies and/or by variation in the stringency of their interpretative stance. The penultimate section explores the future shape of European data protection here, whilst the final one offers some brief conclusions.
THE LEGAL AND POLICY CONTEXT

The general Data Protection framework
Since the inception of data protection consequent to the development of computerized information and communication technology, Europe has played a groundbreaking role in
championing its importance as an issue of fundamental rights. A Council of Europe Data Protection
Convention was finalized as early as 1981 16 and in 1995 the European Union agreed to a Data Protection Directive 95/46 designed to "give substance and amplify" the Convention's provisions.
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In 2000, data protection was also recognised alongside a traditional right to privacy as a distinct right within the new EU Charter. 18 The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, granted the Charter the same legal status as the EU Treaties. 19 Uniquely, it also separately set out a right to data protection in the treaties themselves.
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The material, purposive and substantive reach of European data protection as encapsulated in the framework Directive 95/46 are far-reaching. Absent specific exemption under Article 3.2, its material scope encompasses the "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means" as 16 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS 108). 17 Directive 95/46, recital 11. The extension of the substantive provisions of the Directive to three non-EU members of the EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) is based European Economic Area law (see op. cit., n. 8). The precise relationship between these jurisdictions are both related legal provision such as the protection of data protection in the EU Charter and treaties and interpretations on the law by the Court of Justice of the European Union remains a matter of great complexity, the consideration of which it beyond the scope of this article. 18 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter EU Charter), arts 7 and 8. 19 TEU, art. 6 (1). 20 TFEU, art. 16.
well as in certain structured, manual filing systems. 21 The key terms here are all defined broadly.
" [P] ersonal data" refers to "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (ʻdata subjectʼ)" and "processing … by automatic means" includes "any operation" performed digitally including consultation, dissemination and erasure. 22 Meanwhile, its purpose is to "protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy", while at the same time prohibiting restrictions on the free flow of such personal data within Europe for reasons connected with such protection. 23 The Directive also stresses that the level of protection achieved must be both "equivalent" 24 and "high". 25 Reflecting these wide and ambitious purposes, the default substance of the regime requires that all "controllers" -that is anybody "who alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data" 26 -ensure that their data processing comply with an extensive set of data protection principles, 27 detailed rules relating to data subject transparency 28 and sensitive data 29 and, finally, a range of data security and other control mechanisms designed to secure discipline in data processing. 30 Turning to the Directive's supervisory system, although a right to a judicial remedy 31 and individual compensation 32 must be made available, in reality "very few data protection cases are initiated" 33 and courts play a "small role" in this area ). 34 Instead, the central and "essential component" 35 of this system rests on the establishment in each Member State of one or more independent DPAs which have a duty to monitor application of the law and hear claims by data subjects; in turn, they must also be endowed with wideranging powers of investigation and intervention. 36 Finally, representatives of these agencies must 21 Directive 95/46, art. 3 (1). 22 Id., art. 2. 23 Id., art. 1. 24 Id., recital 8. 25 Id., recital 10. 26 Id., art. 2. 27 Id., art. 6. 28 Id., art. 10-12. 29 Id., art. 8. 30 Id., arts 7, 17, 18-21 and 25-26. 31 Id., art. 
Freedom of Expression under Directive 95/46
The exercise of freedom of expression undoubtedly has the potential to seriously and negatively impact on the privacy and other rights and freedoms which data protection is established to defend. At the same time, the default data protection provisions outlined above also plainly have the potential to seriously interfere with free speech. Clearly, therefore, the law should address the tension between these two sets of rights. However, whilst the need for this was explicitly recognised in Article 9 of Directive 95/46, this was true only as regards processing "carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression". Moreover, even within this special purposes area, Member States were to provide for derogations "only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression". Recital 37 further clarified that there should be no qualification to the requirements of data security and "at least the supervisory authority responsible for this sector should … be provided with certain ex-post powers". 
EXISTING LITERATURE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODLOGY
The growing literature on the European data protection provides a good elucidation of the way in which it "relies on a network of national regulators embedded within a pan-European cooperative structure to oversee and monitor data privacy rules". 48 
Street mapping service -"A street mapping service produces maps with street-level photographic images including pictures of individuals, motor vehicles and homes."
Although free-text responses were also permitted, DPAs were invited to indicate, in relation to each of the scenarios above, which one of these standardized statements was considered correct:
a. Data protection does not apply. These pre-formulated statements attempted to crystallize the four broad approaches to the interface between public expression and data protection which, as outlined above, were put before the Court of Justice in Lindqvist. In essence, they represent ordered categories ranging from full exemption (option (a)) through to full application (option (d)) of the default data protection framework. As a result, it is possible to translate the responses onto a quantitative scale ranging from 0 (no application)
to 1 (full application) of data protection. b. An indication that action had been taken but only in relation to the use of material obtained without proper authorization from another data controller.
c. An indication that action had been taken but only in relation to processing activity not related to material obtained without proper authorization from another data controller.
d. An indication that action had been taken both in relation to the use of material obtained without proper authorization from another data controller and in relation to another type of processing activity.
These four options also represent ordered categories measuring, in this case, the divergent extent of data protection enforcement. 56 An outcome of no enforcement (option (a)) is obviously the least extensive. Meanwhile, whilst option (b) signifies some action has been taken, this is expressly limited to the use of information obtained without permission from another controller. This latter controller will likely be processing for purposes which would be undermined by publication (e.g. medical care
in the case of, say, a doctor's practice) and the unauthorized obtaining of the information will often require recourse to invidious mechanisms such as corruption or blagging. 57 Therefore, enforcement in this context will in principle constitute less of a direct interference with exclusively new media publication than action in other contexts (option (c)) which will necessarily involve wider categories of information, most of which is likely either to have been obtained with consent (e.g. an interview transcript) or to have been self-generated by the publisher themselves (e.g. a photographic image).
Finally, taking action in both these contexts (option (d)) self-evidently constitutes the most extensive enforcement possible. Given this, it is similarly possible to translate these responses on to a 0-1 quantitative scale.
Turning lastly to the question of financial resourcing, DPAs were asked to specify their annual budget dedicated to data protection issues. Where, as is regularly the case, part of the DPA's budget was used to further other objectives such as freedom of information, 58 DPAs were specifically invited to estimate that part of the budget allocated to data protection.
STANDARDIZED RESULTS OF THE DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY SURVEY
As noted above, some 31 DPAs responded to the survey, 25 of which operated at the national and 6 at the regional level. However, as regards interpretative stance, the UK DPA declined to provide any answers, whilst the Netherlands DPA only provided an answer in relation to two out the seven actors. 59 Moreover, approximately 10% of the other answers were received in nonstandardized free-text form. These answers are excluded from the presentation of results in this section and the analysis in the next. In contrast, later discussion focusing on divergences between different European jurisdictions as regards DPA enforcement utilizes quasi-standardized responses which were imputed in place of these free-text answers. Further details on this are provided below.
Turning to the enforcement dimension, a complete set of responses was received here, although two 58 Such a merger of functions is a feature not only of Germanic and UK information law regulation but also of other jurisdictions including Hungary, Malta and Slovenia. 59 The UK DPA justified its non-response on the basis that it considered "it would be unhelpful to attempt to offer a general view of the application of the law to situations where the outcome will necessarily be factspecific, and where we would need additional background information in order to express a view". Similarly, the Dutch DPA stated "most likely because our work has always been a very case-by-case approach" it was unable to respond fully "[s]ince the questions unfortunately don't give enough facts or the multiple choice answers were not the answer we would give".
DPAs technically provided a response in their own words 60 and two others provided some additional free-text specification. 61
Interpretative Stance and Enforcement Extent
The tables overleaf set out general information on the standard responses received from DPAs in relation to their interpretative stance (Table One) and the extent of their enforcement action (Table   Two) . In each case, both the percentage and total number of responses falling within each of the four standardized categories is specified, with the modal category are also highlighted in bold. The last column then sets out an interpretation score and an enforcement score respectively. These are computed from the average of the numeric version of all the categorical responses received in relation to each online media actor. The standard deviation of these responses is also calculated. Finally, the last row provides combined information on the responses as regards all seven online media actors. 60 In sum, the German federal DPA stated that it was "not competent in supervising data protection the private sector apart from telecommunication and postal services provides" and that therefore the questions "could be answered by the data protection authorities of the German Laender only". Meanwhile, the UK DPA stated "[w]e have not taken action in cases involving the groups specified, in relation to their unlawful obtaining of personal data or the context of processing for publication". Given that both responses clearly disclosed that the DPA not itself enforced in this area, both were simply coded zero as regards all the relevant actors. 61 The Austrian DPA, which in any case reported some form of enforcement against all the new media actors specified, stated that its "list is probably incomplete as we are unable to search all case files of the last decade. It is quite likely that action has been taken against any kind of actor at least once". Meanwhile, the Bulgarian DPA stated that its enforcement action against an individual on a social networking site was "in his/her capacity as personal data controller". Turning to the attempt to cross-check the data on enforcement with that readily available on DPA websites, it was found that the very different way in which regulators approached the issues of publicly reporting, retaining and collating information in this area made the collection of systematic and comparable datasets largely impossible. In particular, it was clear that many DPAs only . 63 The authority with jurisdiction for the region within which GSV's German headquarters are located. This DPA was not amongst the survey respondents. 64 It should also be noted that the Portuguese DPA kindly supplied documentation on formal action it had taken on 30 April 2013 against Google Street View. Whilst this information was not found during the collection of data from the Portuguese DPA website, it was later published on this site. It was, therefore, decided to take its contents into consideration when completing the public domain coding. 65 This dataset was also correlated at the level of individual result level with the DPA survey returns on street mapping service enforcement. The Spearman's rho here was 0.774with a two-tailed significance value of 0.00.
Resourcing
DPAs provided information on their annual budgets in a variety of forms. Although the great majority specified a figure in Euros, seven elected to respond using their local currency. 66 Both the UK and Polish DPAs also explicitly indicated that their figure related to a year other than 2013 (the year of the survey). It was, therefore, necessary to normalize these figures as best as possible. This was achieved by using the average exchange rate for 2013 or, in the case of the UK and Poland, 2012
and 2011 respectively (the nearest full calendar year to that specified by the DPA). 67 The special situation in Germany and Spain also had to addressed. 68 Uniquely, these countries divide both funding and regulatory responsibility for supervising data protection between the federal and Länder/regional DPAs. In Germany the federal DPA is essentially responsible only for regulating the public sector, which is outside of the focus of this article, whilst the Länder DPAs regulate the private sector. In contrast, in Spain regional DPAs in Catalonia and the Basque country regulate those entities operating under their region's public law, whilst the Spanish federal DPA is responsible for regulation of all other private and public entities. In the German case, given that responses were received from both the German federal DPA and four Länder DPAs, it was decided to drop separate consideration of the federal DPA and notionally reallocate a portion of the former's budget to the four Länder jurisdictions pro-rated on the basis of their population size within Germany as of 2013.
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Since the German federal DPA's response had indicated no enforcement action as regards new media, the enforcement response from each German Land DPA in effect also represented the combined DPA enforcement efforts specific to that geographic jurisdiction. In the case of Spain, given that no Spanish federal DPA response was received to sit alongside that of the Spanish Catalan DPA, it was considered best to drop the Spanish Catalonian jurisdiction from this part of the analysis as well as the 66 In some cases, the Euro figure provided was only an approximate. Where an exact local currency figure was also set out, this was generally preferred. The only exception was Latvia as no Eurostat figure could be found for the required conversion. 
ANALYSIS OF STANDARDIZED RETURNS
The results of the survey, summarized in Table One (Table Two) , paint a starkly different picture regarding the practical reality of data protection as applied to online media expression. Firstly, the most common DPA position in relation to all seven online media actors was to report no enforcement whatsoever (category a/0); moreover, this was the majority position in relation to all but street mapping (example 7). Secondly, overall, only 16% of responses indicated that enforcement action had been taken place both in the context of information obtained without proper authorization from another data controller and in another context connected to publication (category d/1); moreover, even the case-specific high 77 Commission v Germany, op. cit, n. 11 at [23] . 78 Newman, op. cit., n. 5, p. 190. 79 Nevertheless, even here it should be noted that the survey results disclosed a range of standard deviations ranging from the very low figure of 0.09 in the case of street mapping services (example 7) to the fairly high value of 0.36 in the case of the individual on a social networking site (example 4). This suggests that a diversity even of basic interpretative stance remains present as regards the applicability of data protection to individuals online.
here (which related to social networking sites (example 5)) was only 23%. Thirdly, the overall average enforcement score registered was very low (0.31), with the bottom score (0.17) attributed to search engines (example 6) 80 and the top (0.38) to street mapping services (example 7). 81 Finally, a clear disparity of response across all the scenarios produced very high and stable standard deviations which at 0.39 averaged more than the overall enforcement score. 82 These results contrast markedly with Epp's finding in the comparative case of the United States that strong enforcement mechanisms had emerged in those policy areas which had become infused with "rights-based aspirations". 83 However, development in this case rested not a European-style regulatory system but rather on a "decentralized, court-centred system of oversight" 84 epitomized by the private class action. . 81 Although, as specified above, it did not provide possible collect comprehensive data on enforcement activity through public available information readily available on DPA websites, the information which was collated also indicated very low levels of enforcement. Indeed, vis-à-vis all the examples other than street mapping services, clear evidence of enforcement action was found only in relation to a handful of the DPAs in each case. 82 It may be hypothesized that, as regards the different online media actors, we should expect a significant and positive relationship between the average interpretation score and the average enforcement score. tasks regulators have allocated to them. Nevertheless, it is also clear that there are significant differences in DPA resourcing levels, with some DPAs being several times better funded than others, whether measured on a gross or per capita basis. Whether these or other contrasts can help explain the divergences in reported enforcement of data protection vis-à-vis the online media will be analysed in the next section.
EXPLORING DIVERGENCES IN DPAS' REPORTED ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
The survey results clearly indicated that reported enforcement vis-à-vis online media expression differed substantially between the DPAs. At the most basic level, it is possible to measure this simply by producing a count of the number of types of specified online media actor that each DPA reported it had taken at least some enforcement action against. A more detailed picture, which factors in the type of enforcement registered, is obtained by calculating an enforcement score for each DPA as an average of the categorical enforcement values it reported in relation to all seven online media actors. Table Four below orders DPAs according to their enforcement count and also details their enforcement score. Based on a similar justification to that outlined above as regards DPA resourcing, namely the essentially non-existent jurisdiction of both the German federal DPA and the Spanish Catalan DPA vis-à-vis the private sector as a result of the federal division of powers, these two agencies are excluded from this table and also from the rest of the analysis in this section. 88 As can be seen, whilst approximately 10% of the DPAs reported enforcement action against all seven types of online media actor, almost a quarter indicated no enforcement whatsoever. The enforcement count figures also differed widely (from 0 to 0.81) and the relationship between the two variables was extremely strong.
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Table Four: DPA Reported Enforcement Against Specified Online Media Actors (n=29) 88 For completeness, it should be noted that, whilst the German federal DPA reported no enforcement activity, the Spanish Catalan DPA did indicate that it had carried out enforcement in relation to a news archive and a blogger both as regards material obtained without proper authorization from another data controller and otherwise. 89 The (non-parametric) Spearman's rank correlation is 0.964 with a two-tailed significance value of 0.00. Even aside from the federal jurisdictional issues which confront DPAs in Germany and Spain, there are a multitude of reasons why a DPA in one jurisdiction may take enforcement action against a particular type of online media actor whilst another DPA does not. For example, some actors may be present in one jurisdiction but not the other. Moreover, even if the actor is present in both, if its activity falls within article 9 special purposes as defined in national law then, notwithstanding the contrary steer in article 9 and recital 37 of Directive 95/46, a DPA may find that all possibility for it to engage in substantive enforcement has have been removed under local legislation. 90 However, notwithstanding the potential validity of these rationales in specific contexts, they should not play a significant role in structuring global divergences between the DPAs. The online media actors included in the survey are all well-established and ubiquitous. Therefore, whilst a few of these actors (for example, street mapping services) may indeed not be present in a few EEA jurisdictions, the great majority (from news archives to bloggers to social networkers) are present in all of them. Moreover, given that, as explicated above, the great majority of DPAs explicitly consider the special purposes derogation to be inapplicable as regards most forms of online media activity, formal differences in the legal regulation or national scope of such purposes should also only exercise a marginal overall effect.
In contrast, we might credibly expect differences, firstly, in the level of financial resourcing of the DPAs and, secondly, in the stringency of their own interpretative stance to drive divergence in reported enforcement documented above. Turning first to resourcing, it can be hypothesized that the capacity of a DPA to undertake various types of enforcement action against online media depends 91 As previously noted above, in the case of the German Länder DPAs all these measures had been adjusted in order to reallocate a portion of the national German DPA budget to them pro-rated on the basis of their population size within Germany, thus creating a measure of the resources available in the relevant geographical jurisdiction for regulating data protection in both the private and public sector. Since the German federal DPA had reported no enforcement activity as regards the new media, the response from each German Länder DPA in effect also represented the combined enforcement efforts specific to that particular jurisdiction. 92 This counterintuitive result may have been influenced by the fact that DPAs serving micro jurisdictions generally have very disproportionately large per capita budgets.
In order to investigate a possible relationship between the stringency of a DPA's interpretative stance and its enforcement track-record, it was necessary to compute an interpretation score for each DPA as an average of the interpretation values registered for all seven online media actors. Creation of such an average was complicated by the fact that a large proportion of DPAs provided an answer here in free-text form. In order to accommodate this, quasi-standardized answers were imputed from an analysis of this free-text answer (or in two cases where the free-text answer had no substantive content, from the answer provided by the overwhelming majority of the other DPAs).
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This process allowed for an interpretation score to be calculated for all but two of the responding DPAs.
94 Table Five The results used are also set out in the appendix to this article. 94 The UK DPA did not provide any answer to the interpretative questions and, therefore, obviously could not be included. The Netherlands DPA only provided an answer to two out of the seven online media examples and therefore similarly failed to provide enough data to impute a comprehensive score. 95 Spearman's rank correlations were also performed using street mapping enforcement data gathered from DPA websites. This confirmed a strong association between such enforcement and the DPA's interpretation score (coefficient0.489, significance: 0.015) and the lack of any association of two-tailed significance between enforcement and either the combined and per capita budget measures (coefficients 0.316 and -0.234 and significance 0.124 and 0.260 respectively). At the same time, it also suggested a clearly positive association between this enforcement action and the gross budget measure (coefficient: 0.524; significance: 0.007). This last result, however, needs to be treated with great circumspection since it is apparent that Google Street View is not present in many of the smaller jurisdictions (which naturally have lower gross budgets) such as Cyprus, Liechtenstein and Malta. These DPAs have, therefore, not had significant opportunities to enforce in this area, a fact which explains why they all reported no enforcement action. In sum, although the great majority of DPAs have coalesced on a theoretically onerous interpretative stance vis-à-vis online media expression, most have failed to engage in extensive enforcement in this area. Whilst the generally low level of reported enforcement may be linked to the limited resources of these agencies, the serious divergences between them appear related not to this factor but rather to continued disparity in the severity of their interpretative stance. Moving from a symbolically onerous interpretation into active enforcement in an area such as online media expression may require taking on powerful interests and result in negative publicity. To take the most high profile example, the action by the Spanish DPA to secure a right of erasure on search engines which led to the landmark Google Spain decision required not only confronting an internet behemoth but also publicity decrying the authority's stance as "akin to marching into a library and forcing it to pulp books". 100 In general, it appears that only DPAs with a particularly strong ideological commitment to data protection are likely to prove willing to take on such risks across the online media space. A focus on the often largely paper-based system of "networked governance" 101 achieved within the Article 29 Working Party may, therefore, overemphasise the level of convergence and effectiveness which has practically been achieved within European data protection. This is problematic since such qualities are clearly integral to a well-functioning regime.
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
After several years of negotiation, the EU has now agreed a new General Data Protection Regulation which will replace the existing Directive in 2018. 102 Substantively, this Regulation significantly augments the already stringent European approach including through an expanded list of data principles, 103 much more onerous requirements to ensure transparency for data subjects 104 and far more rule-based discipline mechanisms such as detailed requirements to notify many types of data breaches to a DPA and sometimes even data subjects themselves. 105 This new instrument also places considerably greater formal emphasis on enforcement and harmonization. Thus, at least outside the special expressive purposes the pan-European governance of which remains largely unaltered, 106 DPAs are to be empowered to issue administrative fines for breaches of most aspects of the regime of up to either €10M or €20M or in the case of commercial undertakings up to either 2% or 4% of annual worldwide turnover if this is higher. 107 It is also stated that each DPA must be provided with the "human, technical and financial resources, premises and infrastructure necessary for the effective performance of its tasks and exercise of its powers". 108 As regards cross-border processing, 109 the Regulation sets out rules for ensuring that one lead DPA be appointed to coordinate all matters relating to the enforcement of the law. 110 At the same time, a consistency mechanism is established whereby other DPAs or the Commission may require that the European Data Protection Board (a reconstituted and greatly enhanced continuation of the Article 29 Working Party) issue an Opinion which the lead DPA must either follow 111 or face an ultimately binding Decision being issued against it by the same body. 112 The Regulation also clarifies that the right to individual compensation incorporates a notion of joint and several liability, that it relates to both material and immaterial damage and that, as regards private controllers, data subjects may bring proceedings wherever they have their habitual residence. 113 Finally, whilst many provisions will still allow for derogations specific to each Member State, 114 the directly applicable nature of a regulation means that (potentially divergent) transposition at national level will not in general be necessary.
Despite this, experience under the existing law may lead one to question whether the Regulation will in practice prove adequate to the challenges elucidated above. Even under Directive 95/46, Member States are required to adopt measures and sanctions "to ensure the full implementation" 115 of data protection and the great majority have instituted not just wide-ranging administrative sanctions but also criminal provisions (which often carry a maximum penalty of several years imprisonment). 116 As regards private compensation, the Directive is already clear that a controller will be presumed liable unless "he proves that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage". 117 The Directive also not only sets out the wide-ranging obligations of DPAs to hear claims from data subjects, undertake checks on the legality of processing and monitor the application of the law 118 but further states both that these independent DPAs "must have the necessary means to perform their duties" 119 and that they "shall cooperate within one another to the extent necessary for the performance of their duties". 120 In principle, these formalities have been reinforced by Court of Justice jurisprudence which has stressed inter alia that such provisions must be interpreted purposively "to ensure the effectiveness and reliability of the supervision of compliance" with data protection. 121 However, such strictures have not prevented the emergence of the very partial and fissiparous enforcement reality as elaborated in this article. Such an outcome may instead be related, in a general sense, to a considerable mismatch between Europe's stringent data protection standards and the very limited resources of the DPAs and, more specifically, to a culture within a large number of DPAs where "enforcement actions [especially in controversial areas] have a rather low priority". 122 ameliorating the "regulatory disconnection between data protection law and data-processing practice".
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CONCLUSIONS
Principally as a result of Directive 95/46 and more recently through its recognition in both the EU Charter and treaties, Europe has committed itself to far-reaching data protection laws supervised by statutory regulators who cooperate within the Article 29 Working Party system. This framework has potentially serious implications for the increasingly ubiquitous phenomena of online media publication. In light of this, a comprehensive survey of EEA DPAs explored the interface between
European data protection and the publication activities of seven ubiquitous types of online media actor. This survey demonstrated that these DPAs overwhelmingly consider data protection norms to be strongly engaged by online media expression, thereby concomitantly adopting a generally constrained understanding of freedom of expression. In contrast to this common stringent interpretative stance, enforcement has been both limited and uneven. Whilst the generally low level of enforcement may be related to a severe disparity between the stringency of the law and the meagre financial resources of these agencies, divergences between appear related rather to continuing discrepancies in their interpretative stance. In sum, only DPAs with a particularly stringent interpretative stance are likely to have engaged in extensive enforcement activity.
The theoretically stringent interpretative stance of DPAs may be linked to centrality of data protection within the maturing area of European fundamental rights coupled with their role both nationally and in pan-European forums as the guardians of this framework. 131 Nevertheless, as the Google Spain decision epitomised, moving beyond such theory into active enforcement often requires taking on powerful interests and exposure to negative publicity. Only those DPAs with a particularly strong ideological commitment to data protection appear willing to that those risks. A focus on pan-European processes of ʻnetworked governanceʼ within the Working Party has tended to obscure the resulting lack of practical effectiveness and equivalence within this regulatory regime.
Whilst the new General Data Protection Regulation is predicated on an acknowledgement of some of these deficiencies, questions remain as to whether it will in practice adequately confront these challenges. To be properly effective, it is essential that Member States ensure both that their local DPAs are resourced appropriately and that the European Data Protection Board is given the funding and institutional support necessary to perform its complex new enforcement functions. Finally, more work must be done to develop common legal interpretations which, whilst faithful to the protective ambitions of the law, also both take fully in to account other competing rights and link effectively to a credible enforcement strategy. Although such outcomes will likely prove difficult to achieve, anything less will fail to provide Europe with the robust, legally certain and effective data protection regime which it claims to value so highly.
